CONTENTS

Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument against Materialism
Gary Furash, Bowdoin College ................................. 1

Of Paradigms, Saints, and Individuals: The Question of Authenticity
N. Karl Haden, University of Georgia ......................... 7

Quantum Paradoxes and New Realism
David E. Fenner, University of Miami ......................... 15

Conscience, Sympathy, and Love: Ethical Strategies toward
Confirmation of Metaphysical Assertions in Schopenhauer
Mark Cyzyk, Temple University ............................... 24

BOOKS RECEIVED ............................................. 14

ABOUT THE AUTHORS ........................................ 6
ABOUT THE AUTHORS

GARY FURASH is a senior at Bowdoin College majoring in philosophy and psychology.
N. KARL HADEN is a candidate for the Ph.D. at the University of Georgia.
DAVID E. FENNER is a graduate student at the University of Miami.
MARK CYZYK is at present on leave of absence from the doctoral program at Temple University.
The problem generally with "intuitively certain" or "self-evident" truths is that they often are not certain or self-evident to any but their author. Hence, intuitive knowledge has frequently been attacked on epistemological grounds as not certain, and in many cases, as not constituting knowledge. In the forthcoming pages it will be shown how Schopenhauer's proof that the world is will rests on just such an intuitive base. As such, his proofs are not entirely satisfying. But Schopenhauer himself admits that explanation by its very nature must reach a point beyond which it cannot go; that all explanation leaves something unexplained; that all accounts of the world leave unexplained a qualitas occulta. This does not, however, change the fact that his argument in support of the assertion that the world is will remains somewhat dissatisfying. The acceptance or rejection of Schopenhauer's philosophy ultimately rests on the acceptance or rejection of this, his (not entirely satisfying) explanation of explanation.

However, whereas Book Two of the first volume of The World as Will and Representation contains these proofs—that explanation cannot be ultimate and the world is (known in some intuitive way as) will—it is my contention that Schopenhauer, in Book Four, offers yet more support for his metaphysical assertions. I shall seek to illustrate how his writings on conscience, sympathy, and love (contained in his ethical writings) can serve, whether Schopenhauer intended them to do so or not, as additional strategies toward confirmation of his metaphysical assertions in Book Two of The World as Will and Representation. Schopenhauer's intention with regard to this matter is, though hardly irrelevant, rather indiscernible. Even so, the textual evidence is such that I would like to think Schopenhauer well aware of the meaning, both from a philosophical and a literary perspective, of the striking interrelatedness of his metaphysical and ethical doctrines, and how one facet of his thought could be easily utilized, if not as proof of the other (for to do so would risk a circle instead of resulting in simple radical interrelatedness), at least in an illustrative, heuristic way suggestive of its credibility.

In the preface to the first edition of The World as Will and Representation Schopenhauer states with regard to his great work that: "What is to be imparted by it is a single thought." And the reader immediately wonders what this thought is—a thought that required, in 1818, a large volume (and, we are told, a second reading of that volume) for its proper impartation, and then, in 1844, a second volume of comparable size yet added to that requirement—all for the communication of a single thought. The thought itself is simply stated: The world is will. Indeed Schopenhauer repeats this thought again and again. But what, one wonders, is the content of the thought? This of course is what occupies the two volumes of The World as Will and Representation and is the foundation for the whole of Schopenhauer's philosophy; it seems one cannot accept Schopenhauer's notion of the world as will without also accepting the rest of his system (at least, that is what he seeks to persuade the reader), and, vice versa, one cannot accept any particular facet of his thought without at the same time accept-
ing the notion of the world as will (this because of the radical interrelation between his metaphysical assertions and all subsequent philosophical elaboration—perhaps a manifestation of any system of thought espousing an idealistic monism). Hence “the world is will” is the root and foundation for Schopenhauer’s aesthetic, political, and ethical thought.

But it is here the content of “the world is will” must be questioned. What leads Schopenhauer to this notion? And how much credibility or, in current terminology, what sort of validity does his notion have?

Schopenhauer’s admiration for Kant is renowned, and it is precisely the problems he found in Kantian philosophy that serve as a departure for his own system. The origins of Schopenhauerean thought lie along a decidedly Kantian line and depict representation and its relation to the principle of sufficient reason as the basis and origin for any inquiry concerned with knowledge. Furthermore, both men felt deeply the desire to know the thing-in-itself. But, whereas Kant could not set beyond the representation, whereas in the Kantian system anything underlying or prompting representations must lie outside of those representations and hence outside of human comprehension, Schopenhauer felt the need both to know those things-in-themselves and that it is possible to give an account of how we do know them. His philosophy as a whole is such an account.

We want to know the significance of those representations; to ask whether this world is nothing more than representation. In that case, it would inevitably pass by like an empty dream, or a ghostly vision not worth our consideration. Or we ask whether it is something else, something in addition, and if so what that something is.

Schopenhauer begins his search for significance by considering the body as representation. Surely one has a representation of one’s body as existing subject to the principle of sufficient reason? I can see my body, that is, I perceive my body as existing in space and time and as having a causal relationship with other objects. I have a representation of my body as an object in a world with other objects. But it seems that I am more than a mere body, a mere object—that there is something which differentiates myself from mere representation. Schopenhauer calls this something “will.”

To the subject of knowing, who appears as an individual only through his identity with the body, this body is given in two entirely different ways. It is given in intelligent perception as representation, as an object among objects, liable to the laws of these objects. But it is also given in quite a different way, namely as what is known immediately to everyone, and is denoted by the word will.  

There is an immediacy when I look for myself that is not present, it would seem, when I regard representations of external objects. The will is this immediacy. As such, Schopenhauer would claim, it is not mediated in any way; space, time, and causality do not shape it as they do representations; it is not itself a representation but, rather, it is the ground of representation, the conditioning possibility of representation. Schopenhauer’s appeal to the individual and the individual’s experience of his own body is well-founded. It would seem, at first, that our body has more significance than other representations. Schopenhauer simply terms this special significance will. And because it is unmediated, because it is the thing laid bare, it is therefore an in-itself: the thing-in-itself.

It is just this double knowledge of our own body which gives us information about the body itself, about its action and movement following on motives, as well as about its suffering through outside impressions, in a word, about what it is, not as representation, but as something over and above this, and hence what it is in itself. We do not have such immediate information about the nature, action, and suffering of any other real objects.

From this we can conclude that my self is will, and thus that will is the in-itself of myself; that I am immediately aware of the noumenal reality which forms the possibility of my objectification in the phenomenal realm. In this way, contra Kant, I am aware of a thing-in-itself. But this will,
this thing-in-itself remains singular. It is
yet only an individual will.

Thus far Schopenhauer has arrived at a
very solipsistic position or, as he calls it, a
position of theoretical egoism. This posi-
tion has been distasteful throughout the
history of philosophy and is one which
Schopenhauer as well seeks to avoid.
However, he acknowledges the futility of
trying to invalidate such a position
through philosophical proofs.

Theoretical egoism, of course, can never be
refuted by proofs, yet in philosophy it has
never been positively used otherwise than as a
skeptical sophism, i.e., for the sake of appear-
ance. As a serious conviction, on the other
hand, it could be found only in a madhouse; as
such it would then need not so much a refuta-
tion as a cure.

What must occur if we are to avoid sol-
ipsism is for the outside material world,
and not simply our individual body, to
have a degree of inner significance itself
so that it is not merely representation and
hence actually exists (assuming we are al-
lowed to use such vocabulary in reference
to an object transcending the Principle of
Sufficient Reason) outside of our repre-
sentations, thus making a solipsistic ac-
count of self and reality infeasible. By
allowing this, by requiring this, Scho-
penhauer not only claims that I am will,
but also the world is will.

If we wish to attribute the greatest known real-
ity to the material world, which immediately
exists only in our representation, then we give
it that reality which our own body has for each
of us, for to each of us this is the most real of
things. But if now we analyze the reality of this
body and its actions, then, beyond the fact that
it is our representation, we find nothing in it
but the will; with this even its reality is ex-
hausted. Therefore we can nowhere find an-
other kind of reality to attribute to the material
world. If, therefore, the material world is to be
something more than our mere representation,
we must say that, besides being the representa-
tion, and hence in itself and of its innost na-
ture, it is what we find immediately in our-

It must be emphasized that this inner
significance is not a representation and
thus is not subject to the principle of suffi-
cient reason. It is therefore not rationally
knowable but is immediate or self-evident
in some sense. Though Schopenhauer fre-
cently says that we know the will, this
use of the term 'know' is quite a different
(and elusive) sense from what we nor-

OCTOBER 1989

Criticized on several counts. First, he seems to
have a questionable reading of Kant. Cer-

PAGES 26
Pure Reason. Briefly, Kant’s proof runs thus: (1) I am aware of myself as existing in time; (2) Time is a function of how we come to have representations; (3) Time determinations are possible only relative to something stable or permanent outside of those time determinations; (4) Something in-itself exists outside of the time determined representation of myself that forms the basis—the possibility—for me to have such a time determination. I see no reason why Schopenhauer could not have cited these proofs to his own benefit. Their conspicuous absence from his discussion may lead the reader to wonder whether he understood Kant as, in some sense, maintaining a position of theoretical egoism.

A second major criticism is that there is no reason to suppose the inner significance of the material world is the same as the inner significance we find in ourselves. Insofar as we must attribute to the material world an “inner significance” to avoid solipsism, it is similar to what we find in ourselves. But the inner significance of the material world could be different from our own. It could have its own distinctive significance utterly alien from our inner significance. Supposedly, Schopenhauer demands the inner significance of the world and of ourselves be the same to avoid solipsism, but he offers no proof for this claim. It is, as he says, an assumption.

However, Schopenhauer has conceded that, not only can a reason not be given for the fact that the inner significance of the world is the same as the inner significance of our body, but that we cannot give a reason or make a rationally valid knowledge claim with regard to how we “know” our own inner significance in the first place. In the second volume of The World as Will and Representation he makes this explicit.

The mystery of this inner way, this elusive epistemology (if that is the correct term) is the crux of the problem with Schopenhauer’s assertion that the world is will. We want to be able to validate (or invalidate) his claim—a claim, that he claims, is so immediate, so given to experience as to be untouchable by logical/rational/philosophical inquiry (or meditations). It is upon the acceptance or non-acceptance of this fundamental insight, this single thought, that the whole of Schopenhauer’s system stands, or falls.

Schopenhauer’s “proofs” that the world is will are, on his own admission, not entirely satisfying. However, in the fourth book of volume one of The World as Will and Representation it is my contention that Schopenhauer offers additional proof that the world is will through his discussion of lived states or what may be referred to as existential realizations of the world as will. In Book Two Schopenhauer founded his argument on an intuitive base. In Book Four he offers experiences which serve as realizations of the world as will. These experiences are conscience, sympathy, and love. It is also interesting to note, considering our adoption of terminology, e.g., “existential,” that Schopenhauer mentions the notion of dread in a passage that is directly relevant to our discussion. It is with this brief mention that we shall begin, since it serves as a prelude to the other three.

In Section 63, Schopenhauer defines eternal justice as that which “rules not the State but the world.” It is not retributive justice, as in the justice of the State, but rather, it is the justice of existence itself. It is in this context, that of eternal justice, that Schopenhauer notes that a state of dread (Grausen) exists in the world or, at least, that it is part of the human condition.

When the form of knowledge is called into question, when the *Principium Individuationis* is felt to be undermined in some way, when one is led to question phenomenal existence itself, dread arises. Schopenhauer likens Man’s clinging to the Principle of Sufficient Reason to the clinging of a boatman to his boat in the boundless sea.
Just as the boatman sits in his small boat, trusting his frail craft in the stormy sea that is boundless in every direction, rising and falling with the howling, mountainous waves, so in the midst of a world full of suffering and misery the individual man calmly sits, supported by and trusting the *principium Individualizationis*, or the way in which the individual knows things as phenomenon.\(^8\)

On occasion, Man wonders at the futility of his knowledge. This confusion, this estrangement from the Principle of Sufficient reason is dread.

From this presentiment arises that ineradicable dread, common to all human beings (and possibly even to the more intelligent animals), which suddenly seizes them, when by any other of its forms seems to undergo an exception. For example, when it appears that some change has occurred without a cause, or a deceased person exists again; or when in any other way past or the future is present, or the instant is near. The fearful terror at anything of this kind is based on the fact that they suddenly become puzzled over the forms of knowledge of the phenomenon which alone hold their own individuality separate from the rest of the world. This separation, however, lies only in the phenomenon and not in the thing-in-itself.\(^9\)

Dread is confusion over phenomenal, individual existence. Dread is a realization of futility—the futility of the individual in the face of the whole. The object of dread is the thing-in-itself, and the thing-in-itself is beyond all objectivity. This seeming contradiction, that the object of dread is not an object in the normal sense since it transcends all objectivity, is what distinguishes dread from mere confusion or fear. The object of dread cannot be discussed, analyzed, or in any way rationally explicated. It is the thing-in-itself. Hence it can be said that dread is a sudden insight, a realization of the thing-in-itself—of the will.

The relationship which holds between dread and its "object," is analogous to that which holds between conscience and what prompts conscience. It is with conscience, and later with sympathy and love, that Schopenhauer offers a practical or ethical proof for the existence of an underlying will. Schopenhauer claims that, from a moral standpoint, if we consider what a guilty conscience or the "sting of conscience" (*Gewissensangst*) is, we will find that it is the feeling brought about or the result of performing an evil act. This is a rather commonsensical observation. What is interesting about Schopenhauer’s claim regarding conscience is the reason why it arises. Why does one often feel guilty after causing harm to another? Why is there a guilty conscience at all?

Schopenhauer claims that the guilty conscience is a realization that the world is will. It is an insight, on the part of the morally evil agent, that his actions increase the suffering of another and in some way increase his own suffering as well; his conscience makes him suffer. In this way the *principium Individualizationis* is bridged resulting in a grasp of the world as will. The evil man feels himself harmed in some way by his own actions. This feeling is a recognition that, on some level, he and his victim are one.

He has a presentiment that, however much time and space separate him from other individuals and the innumerable miseries they suffer, indeed suffer through him; however much time and space present these as quite foreign to him, yet in themselves and apart from the representations and its forms, it is the one will-to-live appearing in them all which, failing to recognize itself here, turns its weapons against itself, and, by seeking increased well-being in one of its phenomena, imposes the greatest suffering on another. He dimly sees that he, the bad person, is precisely this whole will; that in consequence he is not only the tormentor but also the tormented, from whose suffering he is separated and kept free only by a delusive dream, whose form is space and time.\(^9\)

Schopenhauer presents the pangs of conscience as an immediate awareness of the world as will, the thing-in-itself. But he also presents the good conscience in the same light.

The opposite of the sting of conscience . . . is the *good conscience*, the satisfaction we feel after every disinterested deed. It springs from
the fact that such a deed, as arising from the
direct recognition of our own inner being-in-
itself in the phenomenon of another, again af-
fords us the verification of this knowledge, of
the knowledge that our true self exists not only
in our own person, in this particular phenome-
non, but in everything that lives.\textsuperscript{14}

Thus Schopenhauer presents both the
good and the guilty conscience as some-
how verifying his claim that the world is
will. Exactly how this verification is
achieved remains problematic. Again,
Schopenhauer would say that such knowl-
edge is immediately given or intuitively
certain. What is important here, however,
is not how “the world is will” is verified,
but that Schopenhauer claims, through the
conscience, \textit{it is} verified. Schopenhauer
offers no innovation here with regard to
what he had previously offered as \textit{proof}
that the world is will in Book Two. What
is innovative about his writings on con-
science is that he points to a specific expe-
rience which he claims is proof that we
can know or directly apprehend the nature
of the thing-in-itself. Further in Book
Four, Schopenhauer points to two other
experiences that serve as verification of
his metaphysical assertion as well. These
two experiences are sympathy and love.

At the end of Section 66 Schopenhauer
states: “All love is compassion or sympa-
thy.”\textsuperscript{15} Section 67 then serves as clarifica-
tion of what Schopenhauer means by sympa-
thy (\textit{Mitleid}). Given the great degree of
internal coherence and consistency of his
work it is not surprising that sympathy is
the acknowledgement of others’ suffering
based on the recognition of our own suf-
ferring and the likeness of the two; we feel
sympathetic for another because we rec-
ognize that person’s suffering as analo-
gous to our own.

Schopenhauer further states that this
sympathy \textit{is} love.

Whatever goodness, affection, and magnanim-
ity do for others is always only an alleviation of
their sufferings; and consequently what can
move them to good deeds and to works of af-
fection is always only \textit{knowledge of the suffer-
ing of others}, directly intelligible from one’s
own suffering, and put on a level therewith. It
follows from this, however, that pure affection
\textit{(caritas)} is of its nature sympathy or compas-
sion. The suffering alleviated by it, to which
every unsatisfied desire belongs, may be great
or small. We shall therefore have no hesitation
in saying that the mere concept is as unfruitful
for genuine virtue as it is for genuine art; that
all true and pure affection is sympathy or com-
passion, and all love that is not sympathy is
selfishness.\textsuperscript{16}

The objection may be raised that Scho-
penhauer has been inconsistent. Whereas
he previously stated that “all love is com-
passion or sympathy,” in the passage just
cited he seems to say that there is a type of
love that is not sympathetic—a love that is
purely selfish. Whereas sympathetic love
is based on our knowledge of others’ suf-
fering, selfish love—love of or for one’s
self—is based solely on knowledge of per-
sonal suffering. But such love remains
sympathetic; it is sympathetic to personal
suffering. It is sympathy with one’s self
and one’s own situation; it is of course,
possible to feel pity for one’s self. This,
however, may be stretching the meaning of
sympathy too far. There are other grounds
though for rejecting Schopenhauer’s
seeming inconsistency. What has not yet
been pointed out is that Schopenhauer has
been presenting different aspects of the
same thing.

Throughout his discussion of sympathy
Schopenhauer tries to maintain two sepa-
rate stances, two perspectives on the mat-
ter. First he presents knowledge of others’
suffering as primary, then knowledge of
\textit{personal} suffering as primary. But, Scho-
penhauer will argue, such individual per-
spectives depend on fragmentation of a
larger more comprehensive perspective.
This larger perspective is suffering in gen-
eral—not necessarily the suffering of oth-
ers, or personal suffering, but \textit{suffering itself}.

Sympathy and love, and conscience,
and dread for that matter, are all experi-
ences governed by the \textit{Principium Indivi-
duationis}; they are events in the phenome-
nal world. But they are human events or
emotions that, so Schopenhauer main-
tains, somehow lead beyond themselves.
This transcendence, is what Scho-
penhauer claims is the intuitive apprehen-
DIALOGUE

sion of the world as will. And such apprehension is not governed by the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Hence it is impossible to adequately discern what the ground of such experience is, for it lies beyond all objectivity. Such a ground, however, is a necessary condition for these experiences.

That this interpretation of Schopenhauer’s thought is sound, that these human experiences are intimately connected with the will, and that Schopenhauer would want moral experience to serve as further evidence in favor of his assertion that the world is will—these are later confirmed in a few passages of his essay “On Ethics” in Volume Two of The World as will and Representation. With regard to the intimate connection between morality and metaphysics Schopenhauer states:

Moral investigations are incomparably more important than physical, and in general than all other; this follows from the fact that they almost immediately concern the thing-in-itself, namely that phenomenon of it which, directly discovered by the light of knowledge, it reveals its true nature as will.17

Again, Schopenhauer does not offer an explanation of what constitutes this revelation but only that, in the moral realm, such a revelation does indeed occur. Schopenhauer later explicitly states that sympathy is a key experience in the recognition of the world as will. He does this in a negative way, reminiscent of Kant, by showing that the will as thing-in-itself is a condition for the sympathetic experience.

On this metaphysical identity of the will as thing-in-itself rest in general three phenomena, in spite of the infinite multiplicity of its appearances, and these three can be brought under the common concept of sympathy: (1) sympathy or compassion, which is, as I have shown, the basis of justice and philanthropy, caritas; (2) sexual love, with capricious selection, amor, which is the life of the species, asserting its precedence over that of individuals; (3) magic, to which also belong animal magnetism and sympathetic cures. Accordingly, sympathy is to be defined as the empirical appearance of the will’s metaphysical identity, through the physical multiplicity of its phenomena.18

It is in this passage that Schopenhauer most closely comes to presenting a human experience as proof for his assertion that the world is will. It must be noted here that Schopenhauer’s conception of conscience also easily fits into such a proof. It will be remembered that conscience, for Schopenhauer, was the result of an immediate realization that all is one, that the human realm is not so sharply divided into atomistic units called “persons” as it would, prima facie, seem to be. Conscience is a sympathetic notion as well; the person with a guilty conscience feels sympathy for the suffering of his victim. Likewise the person with a good conscience realizes that his acts were prompted or were in sympathy with the well-being of others.

Dread, on the other hand, is not so easily subsumed under the general heading of sympathy as conscience and love are. This is due to the fact that, whereas the sympathetic experience retains a somewhat higher degree of the Principium Individualis, i.e., the true relationship between the moral agent and other living creatures is realized while the moral agent remains an individual, on the other hand in a dreadful situation the moral agent’s individuality completely dissolves. Dread is thus a far more radical, violent, and shocking experience than sympathy. But I think it can clearly be seen how both experiences serve to support Schopenhauer’s claim in some way that the world is will.

The objection might, quite rightly, be raised that I experience myself as will just as much as when I experience, say, sympathy—that the experience of myself somehow “gives” the will whereas the sympathetic experience presupposes it. This is undoubtedly true within Schopenhauer’s system. But the problem for Schopenhauer, and the specific point I have been trying to make, is that if he is going to claim some sort of intuitive immediacy as the ground of his assertion that the world is will, and if he is going to attempt an account of that immediacy, then he is going to need a very powerful heuristic device to convince those skeptics who fail to “see” the substance of his claim. What has been brought out and em-
phasized in the preceding pages is precisely the way that Schopenhauer, rather ingeniously to my mind, uses emotional or moral states, e.g., dread, conscience, sympathy, love, as compelling psychical heuristic devices to lead us to an immediate intuitive realization of all he means by "the world is will"—that through these states we can somehow begin to "see" what he means and that once we thus begin to empathize we can "throw away the ladder" so to speak and attain a non-rational, non-representational insight that the world is will.

In short and more generally, my purpose has been, not to depict Schopenhauer as a precursor to the existentialist philosophers of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries (although what I have said, as well as his well-known influence on Nietzsche, will attest to his importance to that movement), but rather to show how his assertion that the world is will has slightly more credibility if it is understood with regard to, not merely his intuitive claims in Book Two, but his presentation and explication of existentially significant lived states in Book Four. With these states in mind his claim would seem to be, if not vindicated, at least more substantial, more worthy of serious consideration by those who would dismiss it as a claim based solely on highly questionable intuitive grounds.

FOOTNOTES

2. WWR, I, p. 100. This is a most profound observation on Schopenhauer’s part. Late nineteenth/early twentieth century neurologists, in fact, coined the term ‘proprioception’ to refer to this sense of immediate "givenness" of one’s body. They go so far as to refer to it as a sixth sense. Their ground for such a claim is that there have been cases when persons have actually lost this sense of identity with their body; the body is only experienced as representation, as an object among other objects in the world. In such cases, one’s body seems wholly disconnected from the sense of self, and thus one feels to be, in a very real and frightening sense, disembodied. For an interesting and readable case history of this see “The Disembodied Lady” in Oliver Sacks, The Man Who Mistook His Wife For a Hat, (New York: Harper & Row, 1987).

This scientific evidence poses serious difficulties especially for Schopenhauer’s project since his system is so dependent on the double experience of one’s body (as representation and as “will”). And though it is unclear what Schopenhauer’s response might be, we should perhaps question his position such that, instead of experiencing the body in two distinct ways, we experience our self in two distinct ways: as a body (representation) and as an immediate object (will). (Though my body is not identical with my self it surely is part of it, and, I submit, vice versa with regard to mind. I think Schopenhauer would agree with this though such a statement is difficult to attribute to a monistic idealist since the mind/body distinction must, for them, ultimately be false.) The problem with this position, however, is that the person lacking proprioception does not feel his body to be part of his self; it is merely a piece of flesh that is somehow always present. The difficulty for Schopenhauer here is intriguing, and current discoveries in neurology provide, at once, impetus for a reconsideration of Schopenhauer as well as what seems prima facie a devastating critique of his position.

3. WWR, I, p. 103.
4. WWR, I, p. 104.
5. WWR, I, p. 105; emphasis mine.
7. Again, this seems to be a problem accompanying any monistic idealism when philosophical distinctions arise; if “all is one,” how then should we speak of distinctions? Rather, how do we account for distinction in the world or, indeed, within our account of that world? Schopenhauer would undoubtedly resort, with the Hindus, that distinction is ultimately illusory or maya. But when offering a philosophical account to ground such claims he must use a distinctive vocabulary to communicate his (substantively distinct) point. It is here, with the distinctions that language brings (to what may or may not essentially be one), that he falls into trouble.

10. WWR, I, pp. 350-351.
14. WWR, I, p. 373.
15. WWR, I, p. 374.
17. WWR, II, p. 589.